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Abstract: How does a farm household in rural Africa react when the government decides 
crop selection? In developing countries, agricultural households strive to optimize a risk 
mitigating utility function rather than a traditional agricultural production function. 
These households are termed “non-separated” as their farming efforts are directed 
towards family food security rather than maximizing agricultural profits. The lack of 
integration with labor and commodity markets makes these non-separated households 
difficult to influence with policy initiatives. Various tests for household separation have 
been developed. 
 
We use a unique dataset from Rwanda to evaluate these separation tests. The data 
include households forced into a separated economic model by government policy, as 
well as, those partially separated and others that remained non-separated. We create a 
modified test for separation using a measure of the alignment of the production and 
consumption functions. 
 
Last, we hypothesize that farm households forced into partial separation will alter their 
crop selection on their other plots to mitigate the perceived risk to family food security. 
We find a weak association between crop selection on these plots and the consumption 
profile of the household.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Land is the principle endowment for developing countries without abundant natural 
resources. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the agricultural sector 
supports in excess of 80% of the population in these areas. Successful exploitation of land and 
the agricultural sector is an important policy priority to improve incomes and food security for 
the poor. These facts are especially prominent in Rwanda, a land-locked country with the 
highest population density in Africa (487 per square km).  
 Land in Rwanda’s agricultural sector is fragmented to the extent that the average farm-
household works with only 0.75 hectares (EICV3 Thematic Report – Agriculture). The FAO 
estimates that a Rwandan household requires a minimum of 0.9 ha to sustain normal caloric 
levels. That 17 percent shortfall has prompted new government land-use policies.  
 In 2008, the Government of Rwanda (GoR) introduced the Land Use Consolidation 
Program (LUC) and the Crop Intensification Program (CIP) under Organic Land Law No 
08/2005, defined as “a procedure of putting together small plots of land in order to manage the 
land and use it in an efficient manner.”  The objective is to encourage small plot farmers to 
consolidate holdings and shift to the priority food crops of maize, wheat, rice, Irish potato, 
cassava, soybeans and beans (Kathiresan 2012).  
 The LUC program is controversial. There is a debate about its effectiveness in 
improving yields. There has been significant disruption in land tenure In Rwanda over the last 
18 years due to the return of over 2.5 million refugees. The resettlement of these refugees into 
new villages (Imidugudu) tended to put them in the better agricultural areas decreasing 
average plot size and producing no benefit in agricultural output (Kondylis 2008).  As a result 
of Imidugudu and the LUC program, there are concerns among farmers about losing control 
over their land and their farming decisions.  
 This research proposes to examine the impact of the Land Use Consolidation program 
from the perspective of farm households that were shifted into the separated economic model by 
the LUC program. We will first examine several tests for household separation and propose a 
modified version specifically considering the alignment of farm production with the 
consumption preferences of the household. We assess crop selection as a possible measure of 
reactions among households that had only a portion their land under the government program. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 will review the relevant 
literature, section 3 will present the research methodology and the data, section 4 will evaluate 
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various tests for separation, section 5 will consider possible risk mitigating crop selection by 
survey subjects and section 6 will conclude. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
 Russian economist A. V. Chayanov first described the economics of peasant or 
subsistence farm households in 1926 (Low 2000 and Thorner 1966). In his view the peasant 
farmer seeks to organize production to maximize a utility function driven by household 
demographics and the related consumption preferences. Chayanov’s key insight was that the 
subsistence farm-household represents a complete and virtually closed economic system of 
supply and demand. His simple production function using only market prices and labor, 𝑌 = 𝑃! ∙ 𝑓 𝐿 , formed the key to maximizing a utility function composed of income and 
leisure,  𝑈 = 𝑓 𝑌, 𝑙 . This model has four key assumptions: (1) the absence of a labor market; (2) 
output, whether sold or consumed, is valued at the market price; (3) farm size is variable even in 
the short-term and (4) there is a minimum acceptable consumption level. Thus, there are three 
limiting factors to maximizing farm household utility: the potential output of the production 
function, the minimum income or consumption constraint and a labor pool composed only of 
household members.   
 Chayanov also noted that the peasant household did not follow normal economic 
precepts. For example, it was not unusual for the investment in labor to exceed the marginal 
value product of that labor. This MPL or shadow wage could vary widely by household. His 
data showed an inverse relationship between farm size and productivity. This inverse 
productivity relationship violates a fundamental tenant of the production function – positive or 
constant returns to scale. Today we refer to Chayanov’s farm household model as a non-
separated household.  
 The puzzle of this inverse relationship became the focus of decades of research 
producing a profound understanding of the complexities of the non-separated farm household. 
In 1962, economic philosopher, Amartya Sen, documented the same phenomenon in India.  
Since then, this aspect of non-separated households has been found in dozens of countries in 
Africa (Barrett, 1996; Collier, 1983; Kimhi, 2006), Asia (Akram-Lodhi, 2001; Benjamin & 
Brandt, 2002; Carter, 1984; Heltberg, 1998; Rios & Shively, 2005), Europe (Alvarez & Arias, 
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2004) and Latin America (Berry & Cline, 1979)1. Using data from 1991, Byiringiro and 
Reardon (1996), found a 300% yield advantage for smaller farms in Rwanda.  
 Numerous research projects1 have attempted to explain this inverse relationship puzzle 
by evaluating the subsistence farm-household as a traditional profit-maximizing business entity 
ignoring the household consumption preferences. This research has significantly advanced the 
understanding of all aspects of these economic entities.  
 
2.1 Missing Markets 
 One line of research points to the lack of markets and effective pricing for the factors of 
production as the source of misallocation of household resources. These inefficient markets 
push farm-households to make uneconomic resource allocation decisions. The consequences can 
be seen in four areas:  
 Without an effective labor market, farmers have no way to measure their opportunity 
costs and will continue to work their small plots long after the marginal value of their labor has 
become unprofitable (Sen 1966). In Rwanda, the lack of external labor markets produces a 
concentration of labor on small plots (Byiringiro and Reardon 1996) increasing yields albeit at 
the cost of investing in labor beyond its marginal product. A secondary issue stemming from a 
thin labor market is the inability to hire and supervise workers needed for expansion. This 
limits the scale of the farm-household to the family time-endowment to work the land (Eswaran 
and Kotwal 1986). 
  In land scarce markets a greater share of farm returns flow to the land production 
factor (Benjamin and Brandt 1997). These excess returns and the related low returns to labor 
are fundamental to the inverse productivity phenomenon. The lack of a land market either for 
sales or leasing means that more productive farmers will not be able to acquire more land thus 
preserving the inverse relationship status quo (Byiringiro and Reardon 1996). The lack of a 
land market reinforces the separated household model. 
  Most small plot farmers are unable to diversify into cash crops in part because there 
are no effective markets for their staples or a distribution channels for cash crops. Consequently 
the non-separated farm-household production is aligned with consumption preferences rather 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Barrett,	  Christopher	  B.,	  Marc	  F.	  Bellemare,	  and	  Janet	  Y.	  Hou.	  "Reconsidering	  Conventional	  Explanations	  of	  the	  Inverse	  Productivity-­‐Size	  Relationship.“	  Duke	  University,	  Department	  of	  Economics,	  (2009).	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than market prices (Le 2010). Production decisions may depend simply on household 
composition rather than commodity market factors of supply and demand (Ligon 2011).   
  Finally, the lack of access to capital markets or credit, limits the farmer’s ability to 
acquire additional inputs whether it is land, improved seeds and fertilizer or small-scale 
mechanization (Eswaran and Kotwal 1986).  
 
2.2 Measurement Error 
  Lamb, (2003) considered the potential that the theoretical violations of the non-
separated household were the result of measurement error, which is a component of the error 
term that would be correlated with plot size. The study found a reversal of the inverse 
relationship when comparing fixed effects against a random effects model, leading to the 
conclusion that the dependent variable was subject to measurement error. This conclusion was 
supported by an instrumental variable estimation as well.  
 
2.3 Farmer Skills and The Non-Separated Household Hypothesis 
  If occupational choice is endogenous and the most skilled farmers remain as farmers 
then not controlling for this effect will overstate the inverse productivity relationship of non-
separated households (Assunção and Ghatak (2003). The occupational choice hypothesis seems 
tenuous in an environment with missing labor markets. Studies using farmer age and education 
as a proxy for their skill level did not account for the small plot yield advantage (Kondylis 
2008). The non-separated household hypothesis might explain a preference for small plots as a 
risk management mechanism permitting the topographical diversification. Barrett and 
Bellemare (2010) also found that unobserved household heterogeneity due to risk preferences 
or varying shadow prices explained only about 30% of the small plot yield advantage of non-
separated households. Even within a household, yields were smaller on larger plots effectively 
ending the farmer skill heterogeneity debate at least for India (Assunção and Braido 2007). 
 
2.4 Soil and Land Quality  
  Soil quality is thought to be a key unobserved variable explaining the behavior of the 
non-separated household. There is some logic to think that better quality land would initially 
be more densely populated and that over the years, passing those better plots through 
generations of inheritance would further sub-divide them so that eventually the yield 
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differences would be quite noticeable (May 1995). An analysis with detailed scientific soil 
quality measurements in Madagascar’s rice region addressed this issue and found a persistent 
0.28% loss of yield for every 1% increase in plot size after controlling for soil quality (Barrett 
and Bellemare 2010).  
  Kikhi (2006) sought to evaluate the endogeneity of cropland decision by the farmers 
using two linear recursive equations: one for the decision to allocate land to a given crop and a 
second one to explain the yield.  This strategy allows for a cropping prediction to measure 
against actual allocation to control for endogeneity. 
His simulation predicted decreasing yields initially 
then increasing at a certain plot size. These results 
replicated a study that included much larger farms in 
showing increasing yields at 10 acres (4 ha) and with 
a productivity curve following a more traditional 
positive return to scale beyond that size (Carter, 
Weibe and Blarel 1990).  (See graph) This may be 
the plot size where economies of scale become a 
factor.   
  This u-shaped size-yield curve might indicate that many empirical studies have 
focused only on very small plots (under 3 ha) typically found in developing countries. This 
leaves only the downward sloping leg of the u-curve for analysis. In effect, the agricultural 
sector scrutinized by researchers did not have any observations with plots large enough to 
resolve the inverse productivity relationship conundrum.   
 
2.5 Measuring Household Separation 
 Benjamin (1992) approaches the separation question using household demographics 
and external labor markets to develop labor supply and demand functions. His model focuses 
on the labor market to test for nonmarket allocations of labor and the potential correlation with 
household demographic structure, which would be an indication of non-separation. Any 
divergence from the neo-classical labor demand model where the first-order condition (MPL) is 
correlated with household structure would indicate non-separation.  He further analyzes the 
shadow wage and its relationship to labor supply, demand and the optimal amount of labor to 
determine if household demographic variables impact the demand for labor. 
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 Benjamin assumes exogeneity of household composition but instruments for wages 
with clustered regional wages and family structure with local population density to understand 
the power of the test if this assumption fails. He argues that endogeneity does not affect his 
results if household structure is recursive to the labor demand function.  More likely omitted 
variables may be correlated with both household structure and labor demand.   
 Key to his test is the relationship between the market wage, the shadow wage and 
household structure. In the non-separation profile, labor demand is a function of the two wage 
rates (shadow and market) and household demographics. The error term here is at risk of 
containing numerous unobserved variables that impact labor demand. After efforts to resolve 
this he states succinctly, “Unfortunately, there does not exists a convincing set of instruments 
with which to control for the potential endogeneity of household structure.” 
 He summarizes the endogeneity concern with a simple statistical model, where L is 
labor, A is land, w is the market wage and n is the household demographic structure:  
 log 𝐿 = 𝛼! + 𝛾! log𝐴 + 𝛽! log𝑤   + 𝛿 log 𝑛 + 𝜖!, log  𝑛   = 𝛼! + 𝛾! log𝐴 + 𝛽! log𝑤   + 𝜃 log 𝐿 + 𝜖! 
 
 Testing for 𝛿 equal zero implies separation. If 𝛿 ≠ 0  𝑜𝑟  𝑐𝑜𝑣   𝜖!, 𝜖! ≠ 0,  then labor use 
determines family size. Household structure is not random and is determined, in part, by land 
size and the income available to support a larger family. If household size changes with 
seasonal demand then we would have non-separation and production and household structure 
would be inter-dependent. 
 Similar to Chanayov, Benjamin’s theoretical construct is based on a twice differentiable, 
quasi-concave household utility function defined by consumption (c), leisure (l) and an 
exogenous vector of household characteristics (a) such as age and gender of household 
members. 𝑢! = 𝑢(𝑐, 𝑙; 𝑎). This is combined with a classic twice differentiable convex production 
function 𝑞 = 𝐹  (𝐿;   𝐴), where L is the sum of family and hired labor and A is land (fixed and 
exogenous). In a separated household profits are maximized independent of the utility function.  
 In separation, the optimal amount of labor, from all sources, is not a result of household 
structure but depends only on technology and wages. The underlying assumptions can break 
down if farmers have a preference for working their own land (an addition to utility which is 
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not necessarily economic), hired labor is not a perfect substitute for family labor or the external 
labor market is weak so there are no outside employment opportunities.  
 Identification of non-separation is observed in a correlation between household 
demographics and labor deployed on the farm. The first order condition of consequence is 
MPL, which equals w*, the shadow wage, and is endogenous to household labor supply and 
demand. Shadow wage is seen as a function of household demographics and the market wage. 
In constrained labor markets MPL cannot be optimized.  
 Benjamin looks at three cases testing only for separation of the household rice operations 
not the entire economic household: (1) where outside labor is constrained by weak markets (2) 
where labor demand exceeds supply (during peak harvest for example) and (3) where wages for 
outside employment are different than wages for hired-in labor.  
 His theoretical approach stipulates a non-separated household would have a strong 
correlation between household structure and farm labor allocation.  His empirical results did 
not support this notion of excess or constrained labor supply related to household 
demographics noting, “The power of the test is limited by the degree that farmers turn to their 
own farms for extra work.”  
 Jacoby (1993) begins with the theoretical recursive two-stage maximization problem 
whereby the farm household focuses on farm profits first then family utility conditional on farm 
output. He develops a Cobb-Douglas production function to determine labor demand but was 
constrained by the Peruvian data set that lacked quantity data on farm variable inputs. He 
divides farm labor into four groups: hired, adult male, adult female and teenagers.  He addresses 
the endogeneity issue using instruments of community level wages and prices. The coefficient 
inputs for the different worker groups did not vary much between his OLS and IV estimates in 
the labor supply function.  
 He uses this production function to derive marginal product of labor for the different 
labor participation groups regressing them on wages: 𝑀𝑃𝐿! = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑊! + 𝑒!. In this formulation, 
an efficient labor market and separated household implies 𝑎 = 0  and  𝑏 = 1, and that 𝑒!will 
contain the usual measurement and optimization errors but should be independent of the desire 
to work. Since wage is part of the measurement error problem he instruments for it with age, 
education and associated quadratic terms. Despite a strong relationship between marginal 
product of labor and the shadow wage, the hypothesis of that 𝑎 = 0  and  𝑏 = 1, is rejected in the 
Peruvian data indicating, according to this test, that they are non-separated households. 
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 Le (2010) revisits both Benjamin and Jacoby. He eschews the development of a full 
production function and all of its complexities for a simpler form: 𝑄 =   𝐿!"   𝑓  (𝑧,𝐹), where f( ) is 
a general non-parametric form allowing him to focus only on the relationship between labor 
and output. He applies both Jacoby: log !"! =   − log 𝜆! + 𝛽 log 𝑤 + 𝜖!, and Benjamin: log !"!" = − log 𝜆! + 𝛼𝐴 + 𝜀!, in simplified form then combines the two in a joint 
estimation: log !"! =   − log 𝜆! + 𝛽 log 𝑤 + 𝛼𝐴 +   𝜖!. He also adds factors to control for fixed 
effects with a regional location dummies. In his Vietnam dataset, the separated model was 
rejected in all instances.  
 
Topic INVERSE RELATIONSHIP PERSISTS 
Benjamin & Brandt (1997)
Barrett, Bellemare and Hou (2009)
Kimhi (2006)
Matchaya 2007)
Sen (1962)
Byiringiro & Reardon (1996) Rwanda
Barrett, Bellemare and Hou (2009)
Eswaran & Kotwal (1986)
Matchaya 2007)
Inefficient Commodity 
Markets
Byiringiro & Reardon (1996) Rwanda
Barrett, Bellemare and Hou (2009)
Assunção and Ghatak (2003)
Kondylis (2008)
Assunção and Braido (2007)
Measurement Error
Chayanov (1923)
Ligon (2011)
Le (2010)
Irrigation Dillon (2010)
Non-separation Model 
(risk management)
Benjamin (1992)
Jacoby (1993)
Summary of  Key Farm-Household Research
May (1995) Rwanda
Soil or Land Quality
Lamb (2003)
Chen, Huffman and Rozelle (2011)
Farmer Skill or 
Household 
Heterogeneity
Lamb (2003)
Access To Capital or 
Credit
Dorward (1999)
Muhinda & Dusengemungu (2011) Rwanda
Dorward (1999)
Population Density 
Historical Migration 
Patterns
Missing Labor Markets
Lamb (2003)
Benjamin (1992)
Jacoby (1993)
Le (2010)
INVERSE RELATIONSHIP EXPLAINED
Missing Land Markets
Dorward (1999)
Muhinda & Dusengemungu (2011) Rwanda
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3. THE DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 Rwanda is divided into 10 zones with specific climatic and topographical attributes 
including rainfall, temperature, rivers, marshes, hills and average elevation.  Overlapping these 
10 zones are 5 provinces (4 excluding the mostly urban area around Kigali for this study) and 
30 administrative districts some of which may contain 2 or more agro-climatic zones. These are 
further subdivided into 416 sectors. There are two main growing seasons each year. 
 The Crop Intensification Program (CIP) and Land Use Consolidation (LUC) program 
were implemented at the administrative district level with significant local authority. Once the 
Rwanda Agricultural Board (RAB) had identified potential areas for priority crops, the local 
district authorities were given targets to reduce the gap between current crop levels and the 
target levels set by the RAB. The districts are held accountable to achieving these levels of land 
consolidation and priority crop production but the actual process of consolidation and plot 
management may vary between districts.  
 To reduce farmer resistance to the LUC program, the GoR offered a variety of 
incentives including subsidized improved seeds and fertilizers, access to extension services, 
distribution and post harvest technologies such as driers and storage (Muhinda and 
Dusengemungu 2012). Sometimes the promised services were not delivered and after 2 years 
the subsidies for fertilizer were reduced eventually reaching zero after 4 years. Despite these 
incentives, most farmers in our focus groups did not describe the program as voluntary. For 
example, it was not permitted for a farmer in the middle of a consolidated area to simply opt 
out. As a result of this process, implementation of LUC and CIP at the district and sector level 
was not random.  
 
3.1 The Instrument and Survey Process 
 The team from the National University of Rwanda (NUR) conducting the household 
surveys was financed by USAID to test the impact of the government’s Land Use 
Consolidation (LUC) policies. Three teams of 5 enumerators surveyed 742 households in 24 
sectors during October of 2013. The sites represented all of the ten agro-ecological zones.  The 
sites included some of the oldest LUC implementations and all of the crops identified in the 
CIP. Site selection in the NUR study was not random and was in part a result of negotiations 
with the Rwandan Agricultural Board, whose consent was needed for the study to proceed.  
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 The survey instrument we developed was extensive covering all aspects of household 
activity including complete family demographics and a full profile of an agricultural production 
function at the plot level. The survey included plot size, seed types, and use of inputs, like 
fertilizer and pesticide, as well as, detailed labor content by function. Harvest results were 
collected for both agricultural seasons included main crops and secondary crops as it has been 
common practice to intercrop, for example, maize with climbing or bush beans.  
 Data was also collected regarding outside labor markets, hired-in labor, wages, and key 
commodity prices. Finally, household experience with food shortages and other shocks was 
detailed, as well as, the alignment of the farm production with the household consumption 
patterns for the main staples. Thus, all of the primary inputs are available to properly test the 
separation hypothesis.  
 
 
 
16.$Kigende$
1.$Tumba$
3.$Nyagasozi$II$
2.$Mpinga$
4.$Rubumba$$
5.$Gikondo$
6.$Manjari$
7.$Rukore$
8.$Gisha$
9.$Nkanda$
10.$Kibilizi$
11.$Rugende$$
12.$NtoviImugwato$
13.$Gikoma$
14. Rwakina$
15.$Tyazo$
17.$Nyakagezi$
18.$Kavumu$$
19.$Karehe$
16.$Kigende$
Site%Distribu+on%by%District%
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3.2 Selection Bias  
 Despite the obvious site selection bias, for the test of the separation hypothesis within 
the sectors, household selection was random, as the plots were spatially assigned to treatment. 
In every instance when asked, focused group respondents replied that individual plots were 
selected by location not ownership or any other household attribute.  
 We tested the treatment selection criteria by plot against a number of alternative 
possibilities. Evaluating the “location only perspective” we looked at the relationship between 
plot type (uphill, valley or lowland), erosion protection, and a vector of other household 
variables (a wealth index, a complete test of demographics, education levels etc.) to see which 
were significant for inclusion of a particular plot in a LUC project. The only significant 
indictors were land type (uphill), erosion protections and the number of adult males in the 
household. Summary statistics comparing plots selected for the LUC program and other plots 
are presented in Table I.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The history and method by which a Rwandan family might acquire ownership of a 
particular plot in a particular location is complex. Plot ownership is the result of generations of 
inheritance and sub-division, deaths due to the genocide in 1994, massive movements of almost 
3 million refugees in and out of the country and government administrative programs 
attempting to adjudicate conflicting claims to redress the loss of property in the various civil 
clashes some going back to 1959. 
 As a result, it is not unusual for one household to own 2 or 3 plots widely dispersed. In 
this sample, 62% of households owned more than one plot. The size, location and ownership of 
more than 10 million plots were finalized in a land registration program completed in 2012. 
The surveyed households were variously affected by the LUC program with 13% having no 
N mean N mean t
'''''Plot'Location'and'Type
Plot%Size 423 35.754%% 985%%% 33.698%%%% 0.265
Distance%from%HH 414 0.832%%%% 964%%% 0.748%%%%%% 1.218
Uphill 423 0.825%%%% 985%%% 0.581%%%%%% 9.086 *
Lowland 423 0.106%%%% 985%%% 0.232%%%%%% E5.535 *
Erosion%Protection%(terraces) 423 0.121%%%% 985%%% 0.265%%%%%% E6.055 *
Erosion%Protection%(ditches) 423 0.600%%%% 985%%% 0.403%%%%%% 6.922 *
Erosion%Protection%(fences) 423 0.007%%%% 985%%% 0.026%%%%%% E2.341 *
Erosion%Protection%(other) 423 0.113%%%% 985%%% 0.164%%%%%% E2.466 *
Table'I'4'Summary'Plot'Statictics'
Comparing'Location'and'Topographical'Plot'Data
Selected'for'LUCNon4LUC
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involvement, 29% with some but not all of their plots included, and 57% with all their land 
under the LUC policy. This variation provides an excellent context to evaluate the degree of 
household separation resulting from the program, as well as, the reaction of households with 
some of their land in the program. 
 
3.3 Description of Key Data Elements 
 
3.31 Land and Plot Data 
 There are 1,413 plots in the data set for the 675 households. We collected 3 data points 
on the size of each plot: the dimensions and the area. Comparing the two we found them to be 
consistent. As a result of the recent land registration program cited above, the farmers had 
good knowledge of their plot sizes. Fortunately, an often-troubling source of error for 
agricultural household studies, land size, has been significantly reduced in this study.  
 We also collected detailed information for each plot including main and secondary 
crops, and a list of who worked on each plot and for how many days a month. Inputs were 
catalogued as well, including seed type, fertilizer type and pesticides used. For each input we 
collected information on the source as well as any government subsidies for that input. Finally, 
detailed harvest data was recorded along with amounts sold in the market and related prices.  
   
3.32 Wages and Labor Markets 
 Family labor by household member and gender, as well as, hired labor was tracked in 
days per month. This statistic was then compared with functional labor data covering land 
preparation, planting, fertilizing etc. The total functional labor days were approximately double 
N=675 Percent'
Use
Avg'Total'
Person'Days
Percent'
Hire
Average'Hired'
Person'Days'(a)
Average'
Family'
Person'Days'
(b)
Average'
Daily'Wage'
Men
Average'
Daily'Wage'
Women
Female'
Wage'
Discount
Labor'Days'
Per'Hectare'
Labor+Type
Groud'Preperation 99% 19.99'''''''''' 61% 15.55''''''''''''''''''' 22.90'''''''''' 730''''''''''''' 710''''''''''''' 2.72% 27.94''''''''''
Planting 99% 10.64'''''''''' 55% 11.35''''''''''''''''''' 10.21'''''''''' 747''''''''''''' 707''''''''''''' 5.33% 14.87''''''''''
Fertilizing 76% 6.49'''''''''''' 31% 6.83''''''''''''''''''''' 6.34'''''''''''' 744''''''''''''' 741''''''''''''' 0.47% 9.07''''''''''''
Irrigating 7% 12.67'''''''''' 2% 2.71''''''''''''''''''''' 16.07'''''''''' 786''''''''''''' 800''''''''''''' O1.82% 17.71''''''''''
Weeding 97% 15.39'''''''''' 55% 15.67''''''''''''''''''' 15.21'''''''''' 723''''''''''''' 717''''''''''''' 0.74% 21.50''''''''''
Harvesting 97% 9.79'''''''''''' 51% 10.18''''''''''''''''''' 9.56'''''''''''' 779''''''''''''' 740''''''''''''' 5.03% 13.68''''''''''
Transport'to'market 37% 3.86'''''''''''' 15% 4.07''''''''''''''''''''' 3.76'''''''''''' 1,052'''''''''' 849''''''''''''' 19.27% 5.40''''''''''''
Table'II'O'Labor'Use
''(a)'For'those'HH'hiring'labor'for'this'function,'the'average'hired'days'used
''(b)'For'those'HH'using'labor'for'this'function,'the'average'days'used
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the days per month, which matches well with the 2 - 3 months of high labor activity during the 
four-month season. (Table II) 
  Only 91 households reported working outside on other farm for cash wages. The 
reported wage rates were from 15 geographically dispersed sectors and were remarkably 
consistent averaging Rwf 734 per day with a standard deviation of only Rwf 40.  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 Subject households were more likely to use hired labor. (Table III) There were 1,481 
observations of households hiring labor from the “days per month” question and 5,430 
observations from the functional labor questions. The difference is due to possible recording of 
the same worker planting and then later weeding. Wages were modestly lower for the “days 
per month” hired labor and more variable averaging Rwf 692 per day with a standard deviation 
of Rwf 181. The functional hired labor wages averaged Rwf 745 per day with a standard 
deviation of 234. The survey results show that wages are very consistent across Rwanda 
possibly owing to the small size of the country and the relatively efficient regional bus systems.  
 These tables imply that there is a fairly active labor market with 56.4% of households 
buying labor to supplement the family workforce and 102 households with a family member 
working outside for a wage.  
 
3.33 Crop Prices 
 Crop price data included 925 observations covering 17 different crops. All of the CIP 
crops were well represented in the price data. For the purposes of the separation test, to ensure 
a harvest value (p*Q), I assigned prices to all farms whether they reported selling any crops or 
not. In the case of missing prices, where the household was either consuming their harvest or 
the data were simply not reported, I assigned average prices as calculated from observations for 
the same crop in the same sector. There are significant regional variations in market prices due 
to transport costs and intermediaries. What interest us here are the farm gate prices, which 
! N=!675 Hired!Labor
No!Hired!
Labor
Use!family!labor?! Yes 640 56.4 43.6
No 35 97.1 2.9
Wage!Employment!Last!Year? Yes 102 59.8 40.2
! No 573 61.8 38.2
NonFAgricultural!Employment!Last!Year? Yes 30 90.0 10.0
Table!III!F!Cross!Tab!of!Hiring!In!and!Hiring!Out
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were remarkably consistent. For example, maize was harvested and sold in 17 sectors with only 
a modest variation in the mean price. 
 
3.34 Harvest Quantities 
 There are two growing seasons in Rwanda. This study focuses on only the first season 
as the field surveys were conducted before the complete harvest results were available for the 
second season. As is typical in studies of this type, the harvest volumes were self-reported not 
measured in the field. Rwandans grow a wide variety of crops so it is not possible to compare 
crop yields across the sample of 675 households. Instead a harvest value variable is created 
from the product of the farm gate prices and the reported harvest volume for each crop 
produced by the household. 
 
3.35 Household Food Security Risk Profile 
 To assess possible risk aversion to the 
separated household model, data were collected on 
food availability and other household shocks. More 
than 66% of households reported not having 
enough to eat one day in the most recent week 
implying that food security would be a high 
priority for the family farm production. Food 
availability follows a pattern aligned with the two 
growing seasons with February and October being 
the worst months. To supplement the food 
shortage risk we collected data on a variety of 
negative household shocks with the caveat that the 
shock “affected your household’s ability to eat or 
changed what you owned”. These summary statistics are presented in Table IV.	   
 
3.35 Endogeneity Concerns 
  The peasant farm-household is a closed economic system and consequently is rife with 
endogenous relationships. Consumption is determined by family size, which also determines, in 
a large part, the labor pool. Productivity of labor is also a function of household structure so 
Shock&Factor Obs. Percent
Drought 289 32.2%
Floods 50 5.6%
Landslide 8 0.9%
Crop<pest/disease 38 4.2%
Epidemic 9 1.0%
Food<prices 36 4.0%
Ag<imput<costs 117 13.0%
Job<loss 74 8.2%
Illness/Accident 43 4.8%
Death<of<Head 24 2.7%
Violence 14 1.6%
Death/working<member 11 1.2%
Death<of<other<member 6 0.7%
Theft 12 1.3%
Hail 45 5.0%
Very<low<crop<prices 121 13.5%
&&&&&Total 897
Table&IV&9&Houshold&Shocks
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that arriving at a clear separation of supply and demand is quite difficult. Rather, than retrace 
the steps of prior research looking unsuccessfully for instruments, we have accepted their 
conclusion that instrumenting for household structure is a near impossible undertaking.  
 
3.4 Summary Statistics 
 Below is a table of summary statistics, which compares each of the three sample groups; 
households that had No LUC plots (n=83), with All LUC plots (n=373) and with some LUC 
plots termed, “Partial LUC” (n=219), against the other two. Later we will look at a sub-group 
of the Partial LUC sample (n=102), that were obliged to grow crops which were not a 
consumption preference.  This group had the opportunity to modify the crop selection on their 
other plots in a possible adjustment to the government mandated crop selection. 
 There are some significant differences of the means in certain categories some of which 
are to be expected given the nature of the data. Others are less obvious. For example, we find 
that on average Partial LUC households have more land than the other two groups. This is 
logical, as they would need to have more plots to have the outcome with some that are in and 
some excluded from the LUC program. Similarly, these households tend to score higher on the 
wealth index, lower on the household shocks index and they have fewer “food short months”.  
They also have a greater production-consumption alignment, an element we will examine in 
more detail later. 
 There is an interesting a subset of the Partial LUC group (n=102) that was required to 
grow non-consumption preference crops on their LUC plots. This sub-group dataset will form 
the basis of the search a household reaction to the requirement to use some of their land for 
cash crops.  
 In other areas, such as education, household size, gender and age, the three groups are 
quite similar. 
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3.5 Methodology  
 We will apply three models to test for household separation. The first is from Jacoby 
(1993) who uses a reduced form based on a Cobb-Douglas production function, 𝑙𝑜𝑔    𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒∗ =𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑤 .   The expectation here is that 𝛽 = 1, for separated households and that the degree of 
non-separation will result in β tending towards zero.   
 The second model is from Benjamin (1992) using an equilibrium shadow wage 
specification 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒∗ = 𝛽  𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑤 + 𝛼𝐴, where A is a vector of household attributes and w is 
the market wage for farm laborers.  Benjamin uses household demographic composition as the 
key household attribute - the number of adult males, adult females and children. In a separated 
household, Benjamin predicts that 𝛽 = 1, and 𝛼 = 0. 
 Third, we apply Le (2010), who combines the two tests above based on the shadow 
wage defined by Benjamin and Jacoby. Le derives the shadow wage in a more flexible form 
recognizing that w* is the MPL at the farmers expected optimized production level. Beginning 
N mean N mean t N mean N mean t N mean N mean t
'''''Demographics
Male%head 62 75% 308 82% %% 178 81% 307 82% 62%%% 75% 178% 81%
Female%head 21 25% 67 18% % 41 19% 66 18% 21%%% 25% 41%%% 19%
Age%HH%Head 83 43%%%%%%%%%%% 373 45%%%%%%%%%%% 81.372 219 47 373 45%%%%%%%%%%% 1.076 83%%% 43 219% 47%%%%%%%%%%% 82.084 *
Education%HH%Head 83 2.36%%%%%%% 371 2.56%%%%%%% 81.378 219 2.58 371 2.56%%%%%%% 0.212 83%%% 2.36%%%%%%% 219% 2.58%%%%%%% 81.129
HH%Size% 83 4.78%%%%%%% 373 5.37%%%%%%% 82.425 * 219 5.35 373 5.37 80.105 83%%% 4.78 219% 5.35%%%%%%% 82.262 *
Adult%Males% 83 0.95%%%%%%% 373 1.35%%%%%%% 83.567 * 219 1.35 373 1.35 0.015 83%%% 0.95 219% 1.35%%%%%%% 1.000
Adult%Females 83 1.39%%%%%%% 373 1.45%%%%%%% 80.692 219 1.46 373 1.45 0.053 83%%% 1.39 219% 1.46%%%%%%% 0.772
Children 83 2.45%%%%%%% 373 2.57%%%%%%% 80.622 219 2.54 373 2.57 80.191 83%%% 2.45 219% 2.54%%%%%%% 80.455
'''Labor'and'Wages % % % %
HH%market%wage 83 742%%%%%%%% 373 750%%%%%%%% 80.311 219 750 373 750 0.007 83 742 219% 750 80.339
Total%Labor%(days/month) 83 46.4%%%%%%% 373 50.2%%%%%%% 80.796 219 76.7 373 50.2 6.671 * 83 46.4 219% 76.7 84.694 *
Total%Functional%Labor%(days) 83 66.9%%%%%%% 373 91.9%%%%%%% 82.298 * 219 101.8 373 91.9 1.336 83 66.9 219% 101.8 83.931 *
'''''Land % % % %
Total%HH%Land 83 54.12%%%%% 373 64.98%%%%% 81.067 219 89.67 373 64.98 2.931 83 54.1 219% 89.7 82.497 *
Total%non8LUC%land 83 54.12%%%%% 373 8%%%%%%%%% 219 48.47 373 8%%%%%%%%% 10.642 * 83 54.1 219% 48.5 0.532 %
%%%%Total%pct%land%in%LUC 8%%%%%%%%% 100% 52% 83 % % 52%
Average%Plot%Size%(ares) 83 29.34%%%%% 373 44.54%%%%% 81.905 219 34.03 373 44.54 81.999 83 29.34 219% 34.03 80.927
Total%HH%plots 83 1.81%%%%%%% 373 1.79%%%%%%% 0.145 219 2.72 373 1.79 10.442 * 83 1.81 219% 2.72 86.923 *
Total%Harvest%Value%(Rwf) 83 112,238% 373 212,780% 81.645 219 178,784 373 212,780% 80.827 83 112,238% 219% 178,784% 81.615
Yield%per%Are(Rwf) 83 3,368%%%%% 373 4,869%%%%% 82.088 * 219 3,134 373 4,869%%%%% 83.756 * 83 3,368%%%%% 219% 3,134%%%%% 0.466
Total%Plots 150 667 596
'''''Production'Alignment
Pct%Consumed%Maize%grown 83 0.4357 373 0.3780 1.185 219 0.5122 373 0.3780 3.807 * 83 0.4357 219 0.5122 81.399
Pct%Consumed%Beans%grown 83 0.5211 373 0.4573 1.313 219 0.6309 373 0.4573 5.113 * 83 0.5211 219 0.6309 82.208 *
Pct%other%HH%food%grown 83 0.2438 373 0.2562 80.590 219 0.3391 373 0.2562 5.423 * 83 0.2438 219 0.3391 83.886 *
'''''Other
Food%Short%Months 83 2.5%%%%%%%%%% 372 2.4%%%%%%%%%% 0.484 216 1.7 372 2.4 83.460 * 83 2.5 219 1.7 2.851 *
HH%Shock%Index 83 0.5221%%% 373 0.5303%%% 80.254 219 0.4400 373 0.5303 83.884 * 83 0.5221 219 0.4400 2.594 *
HH%Wealth%Index 83 0.4576%%% 373 0.4779%%% 80.568 219 0.5537 373 0.4779 3.135 * 83 0.4576 219 0.5537 82.670 *
Table'V'<'Summary'Statictics'
Comparing'All'Sample'Groups'
No'LUC All'LUC Partial'LUC All'LUC No'LUC Partial'LUC
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with a semi-parametric production function 𝑄 = 𝐿!!𝑓 𝑧,𝐹,𝜎 , where f( ) is non-parametric. He 
then allows the labor scalar, 𝜆!, to vary across regions (R) and crop types (O) increasing the 
flexibility setting 𝜆! = 𝑒!!!!!!!!!!!! . A random weather shock is captured in 𝜉. Due to this 
unknown random weather shock 𝜖:  𝑄 = 𝑄𝑒!, farmers’ MPL is based on their expected Q, so that 𝑀𝑃𝐿 = !"# !!" = !"# !!" = 𝜆!𝑝𝑄𝑒!! . Taking logs and substituting w* for MPL produces: log !"! = − log 𝜆! + log 𝑤∗ + 𝜀, which becomes the basis for Le’s tests.  
   
 Substituting Benjamin’s shadow wage formulation brings this test: log 𝑝𝑄𝑤𝐿 = − log 𝜆! + 𝛼𝐴 + 𝜀 
 Similarly, Le leverages Jacoby’s form to derive: log 𝑝𝑄𝐿 = − log 𝜆! + 𝛽 log 𝑤 + 𝜀 
 Finally combining the two brings Le’s joint specification: log 𝑝𝑄𝐿 = − log 𝜆! + 𝛽 log 𝑤 + 𝛼𝐴 + 𝜀 
  
 These are the core specifications that will be used for the separation test. In a separated 
household we expect that 𝛽 = 1 and 𝛼 = 0.   
 Note that Le’s joint specification begins with a production function 𝑄 = 𝐿!!   𝑓(𝑧,𝐹,𝜎).=, 
where the functional form of f( )was left undefined but the labor input must have a Cobb-
Douglas form. The exponent on the labor factor, 𝜆! = 𝑒!"!! , is designed to allow variability of 
labor productivity by household according to soil quality and crop type. To apply the labor 
scalar, 𝜆!, (𝜆𝐿 = 𝑒𝜆0+𝜆1𝑅+𝜆2𝑂+𝜉), we followed Le using a CIP crop dummy for crop type (O) and a 
regional dummy based on the 42 geographic cells (R).  We will see in the empirical section how 
this becomes problematical. 
 We also apply fixed-effects regressions clustered around 42 cells and households in an 
attempt to control for unobserved variations in weather and soil quality in the Jacoby and 
Benjamin tests. Although the idiosyncratic nature of regional weather patterns and soil quality 
(which can vary dramatically every 50 meters) may not be captured in this technique it is the 
best measure available in the data. 
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 Last, we directly examine the alignment of production and consumption in the 
household as a possible indicator of separation. Our expectation is that a household that grows 
most of what they eat will have a strong association with the non-separated farm household 
model. 
 
3.51 Connecting Crop Selection to the Shadow Wage  
 To validate using the Rwanda data set to measure the effectiveness of the separation 
hypothesis tests by Jacoby, Benjamin and Le, it is essential to establish the theoretical 
relationship between household crop selection decisions and the rationale behind the household 
allocation of labor, a key component of the shadow wage w*. Note that the shadow wage 
calculations in all the empirical models are estimates using the log of the average wage or log !"! , rather than the marginal product of labor or first order condition from the production 
function.  
 Since we are making the assertion that LUC plots are managed in a separated model as 
a result of exogenous crop selection, we need to show that the loss of the crop selection decision 
to external parties will have an impact on the shadow wage - the measure used in the tests.  
Further, we should be able to predict in a theoretical model how that linkage works and 
whether the relationship is positive or negative.  
 We proceed as follows using Le’s simple construct: 
 Assume a household utility function:  𝑈 𝑐, 𝑙;   𝐴  where c is consumption, l is leisure and A 
is a vector of household preference drivers such as family structure, education etc.  
 Assume also a household production function: 𝑌 = 𝑄  (𝐿,𝐹) + 𝑤𝑚, where Q, the family 
farm output, is a function of, L, labor and, F is a vector of fixed and variable inputs including 
land, seed fertilizer, farm equipment etc. In this production function, m is the desired labor 
outside of the family farm, w is the market wage and p is the value assigned by the family to the 
farm output, either market prices or a utility value or shadow price, p*. (Lopez 1983) If the 
household consumes all its output, then U, is constrained by a budget: 𝑐 = 𝑝𝑄 + 𝑤𝑚. Further, m 
is constrained by the traditional time allocation model where 𝑇 = 𝑙 + 𝐿 +𝑚. In a constrained 
labor market m will either be zero or limited to an upper bound, M. 
 Now we maximize U subject to the budget constraint using a Lagrangian function: 1     ℒ = 𝑈 𝑐, 𝑙;𝐴 + 𝜆(𝑐 − 𝑝𝑄 − 𝑤𝑚)    2     ℒ = 𝑈 𝑐, 𝑙;𝐴 + 𝜆(𝑐 − 𝑝𝑄 − 𝑤(𝑇 − 𝑙 − 𝐿))  substituting for m 
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3     ℒ! = 𝑈! + 𝜆𝑤 = 0   =>   𝑈! = −𝜆𝑤    first order condition for l 4     ℒ! = 𝑈! + 𝜆 = 0 =>   𝑈! = −𝜆    first order condition for c 5     𝑤∗ = !!!!       solving for w* 
 Recall that, 𝑈! is directly a function of price and that 𝑈! is only indirectly dependent on 
price, that is, the price effect on consumption is more pronounced than on the demand for 
leisure. Demand for leisure will decline somewhat due to increase demand for labor if prices 
rise, but the movement is constrained by available inputs, such as land. Thus, when the 
household assigns a value to the crop, p*, greater than the market price, p, they labor under the 
false assumption that their shadow wage, w*, is higher than the market wage. Using actual 
market prices to evaluate the shadow wage instead of p*, will result in a w* below the market 
wage, w.  
 This establishes the relationship between crop selection and w*. The relationship is 
consistent with the common observation that households over invest in labor on their own 
plots because they assign a higher value to their consumption crops than the market price of 
those crops.  Consequently, they are undervaluing their own labor with respect to the market 
wage, or w* < w.  
 In the case of a household in the LUC program where they are obliged to grow non-
consumption crops, the household will undervalue those crops relative to their original 
preference for consumption crops.  The decline in utility means p* will tend towards the market 
price p as the households will have no other reference value for these cash crops. Households 
will adjust (reduce) their allocation of labor so that the shadow wage, w*, will tend towards the 
market wage, w.  
 According to this analysis, as the crop decision becomes exogenous and involves non-
preference crops, we should observe increasing alignment of the shadow wage with the market 
wage. Further, in cases where the exogenous crop decision happens to include the preference 
crops, the alignment of the shadow wage with the market wage should be less pronounced. 
 
4. TESTING FOR HOUSEHOLD SEPARATION 
4.1 Applying Jacoby  
 The simplified Jacoby test regresses the log of the average wage (pQ/L), a proxy for 
the shadow wage, against the market wage. The prediction is that the coefficient of the market 
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wage will approach unity as a household moves closer to the separated model. As we had two 
labor measures available, total HH functional labor and total HH labor, we created a dependent 
variable with both. There was no significant difference in the test results using the two labor 
measures so we chose to present the dependent calculated with the functional labor measure. 
  Table VI, shows that the coefficient on the market wage moves closer to 1 as the LUC 
participation increases. The coefficients for the partial-LUC and All LUC are significant, 
whereas the coefficient for the household group expected to be non-separated are small and 
insignificant. In effect, as the crop decision becomes more exogenous, the household moves 
towards a separated model and the difference between shadow wage and market wage shrinks. 
The test also held up when we included an indicator for LUC program crops (CIPcrop). That 
wasn’t the case using geographic indicators, such as, sector or agricultural zones. The test also 
performed poorly in a fixed-effects regression clustered around the 42 geographic designations 
(administrative cells).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Applying Benjamin 
 Benjamin’s original test depends on an approximation of the shadow wage:  log  (𝑤∗) =𝛽log  (𝑤) + 𝛼𝐴, where A is a vector of preference shifters defined by household composition 
(adult males, adult females and children). Using the same proxy for shadow wage, log  (pQ)/L, 
Benjamin predicts that for non-separated households, the preference shifters have a greater 
influence on shadow wage than the market wage or that 𝛽 = 0, and 𝛼 = 1.  
 Applying Benjamin’s test did not prove out that theory. (Table VII). The non-LUC 
group that we expected to be non-separated did not show any significant influence on the 
shadow wage by the preference shifters. In fact total children was significant in the group we 
No#LUC Partial#LUC All#LUC No#LUC Partial#LUC All#LUC
! 83 219 373 ' 83 219 373
log_HH_mktwage 0.15059 0.77379 * 1.13587 * 0.1478!!!!!!!! 0.73808 * 1.17019 *
(0.54311)!!!! (0.33633)!!!! (0.25610)!!!! (0.5388)!!!!!! (0.34441)!!!! (0.26995)!!!!
CIPcrop A0.01570 A0.253011 0.17066!!!!!
(0.6898)!!!!!! (0.24209)!!!! (0.18996)!!!!
_cons 5.81936 1.89718 A0.36013 5.8521!!!!!!!! 2.35779 A0.73114
(3.5688)!!!!!! (2.2214)!!!!!! (1.6840)!!!!!! (3.6402)!!!!!! (2.3261)!!!!!! (1.8458)!!!!!!
F!test 0.07 6.61 21.42 0.04 3.4 9.8
Standard!errors!appear!in!parentheses
Table'VI'/'Jacoby'Test'Results
Simplified'Jacoby
Depndent:'log'(w*)'='log'(pQ/L)
Jacoby'with'Crops
Depndent:'log'(w*)'='log'(pQ/L)
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expected to show as separated households – exactly the opposite effect that Benjamin would 
have predicted. The results are surprising in that the preference shifters also define to a certain 
extent the available supply of labor to the farm-household.  
 Le’s modification of Benjamin, log !"!" = − log 𝜆! + 𝛼𝐴 , reduces the independent 
variables to the preference shifters and a modifier of labor productivity, log 𝜆! , defined by 
regional and crop variations.  As described above, the regional measures in the data were not 
useful, so we applied Le using only the crop indicator. In any case, the results were similar.  
Preferences shifters were only significant in the All LUC case, just the opposite of the model 
prediction. The cell clustered fixed effects regressions produced similar outcomes (results not 
presented).  
  
 
 These results provoke the question – why didn’t the Benjamin test work as expected? 
We speculate that household demographics, although a key component of labor supply, lack 
variability by household and are too broad to be a strong determinant of the shadow wage 
relationship.  
 To address that question we modified Benjamin’s original relationship with a measure of 
the alignment of the household production with its consumption preferences. Using the answer 
to the question, “During the past 12 months what was the most important source of the main 
food the family eats?” The alignment measures were based on the response, “Own production.”  
No#LUC Partial#LUC All#LUC No#LUC Partial#LUC All#LUC
! 83 219 373 83 ' 219 ' 373 '
log_HH_mktwage 0.16132!!!!! 0.76660!!!!! * 1.21172!!!!! *
(0.57372)!!!! (0.30355)!!!! (0.24552)!!!!
total_adult_females 0.10245 =0.06094 =0.05620 0.09125 =0.04923 =0.06072 !
(0.17297)!!!! (0.10218)!!!! (0.08370)!!!! (0.13465)!!!! (0.08702)!!!! (0.07708)!!!!
total_adult_males 0.15099 0.06462 0.12998 0.20820 0.05520 0.12460 *
(0.19119)!!!! (0.07812)!!!! (0.07156)!!!! (0.24030)!!!! (0.07219)!!!! (0.05962)!!!!
total_children 0.10809 0.07244 0.09509 * 0.10632 0.07257 0.09226 *
(0.08512)!!!! (0.04316)!!!! (0.03866)!!!! (0.07308)!!!! (0.04651)!!!! (0.03771)!!!!
CIPcrop 0.26714 =0.19332 0.15555 !
(0.65090)!!!! (0.23807)!!!! (0.18287)!!!! !
_cons 5.19862 1.76204 =1.19733 =0.60719 0.39121 0.08564 !
(3.79267)!!!! (2.03208)!!!! (1.63827)!!!! (0.72502)!!!! (0.40403)!!!! (0.22219)!!!!
F!test 0.65 2.63 7.61 0.86 0.93 2.61
Standard!errors!appear!in!parentheses
Dependent:''log'(w*)'='log'(pQ/L) Dependent:''log'(pQ/wL)
Table'VII'?'Benjamin'Test'Results
Original'Benjamin Benjamin'(Le's'Modification)'with'Crop
	   23 
 We see the results in Table VIII. In this case, using household production-consumption 
alignment rather than household demographics, Benjamin’s test performed exactly as expected.  
The coefficient on market wage is close to zero for the non-separated households and the 
coefficients on the alignment measures for maize and beans are significant.  Further, as the 
households are forced from non-separated (no-LUC) to a separated (All LUC) model, the 
coefficient on market wage climbs to one and is increasingly significant.  Moreover, none of the 
consumption alignment factors are important influences on the shadow wage for either the 
partial LUC or All LUC groups.  
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Applying Le’s Joint Specification  
 The theoretical specification in Le’s general form, log !"! = − log 𝜆! + 𝛽 log 𝑤 +𝛼𝐴 + 𝜀, creates an empirical difficulty in that the first independent term, 𝜆𝐿 = 𝑒𝜆0+𝜆1𝑅+𝜆2𝑂+𝜉 , 
requires the log of non-continuous dummy variables. To overcome this Le simply includes the 
dummies in the regression. We used a CIP crop dummy for crop type (O) and two different 
regional dummies (R), based on the agro-ecological zones and the 42 geographic cells. The cell 
dummies presented difficulties in that the degrees of freedom in some cells were very small. 
  The results are displayed in Table IX. In no case did Le’s joint specification produce the 
expected results. This is not too surprising, as the Benjamin test had failed with the household 
demographic preference shifters. Retaining those regressors and adding the complexity of 
geographic and crop dummies was unlikely to produce a better outcome. 
No#LUC Partial#LUC All#LUC
! 83 219 373
log_HH_mktwage 0.03181 0.77040 * 1.08512 *
(0.54752)!!!!! (0.30681)!!!!! (0.24998)!!!!!
pct_maize_grown A0.95119 * A0.10642 A0.28603
(0.40192)!!!!! (0.19593)!!!!! (0.19426)!!!!!
pct_beans_grown 0.89573 * 0.09935 0.05184 !
(0.43151)!!!!! (0.21418)!!!!! (0.20189)!!!!!
pct_other_total_food_grown 1.33978 0.00134 A0.56479
! (0.80484)!!!!! (0.43763)!!!!! (0.42754)!!!!!
_cons 6.22267 1.91087 0.20317
(3.58653)!!!!! (2.05321)!!!!! (1.66651)!!!!!
F!test 2.64 1.73 7.04
Standard!errors!appear!in!parentheses
Original.Benjamin.with.Consumption.Alignment
Dependent:..log.(w*).=.log.(pQ/L)
Table.VIII.J.Benjamin.with.Consumption.Alignment.Test.Results
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 We also tested Le’s formula while replacing the household demographic preference 
shifters with the production-consumption alignment indicators as in our prior modification of 
Benjamin. This change did not improve the efficacy of the test as none of the important 
variables have significant coefficients. Further, there is no obvious relationship between the 
coefficients and the status of the household in terms of its relationship to market factors. The 
results are shown in Table X.  
No#LUC Partial#LUC All#LUC No#LUC Partial#LUC All#LUC
! 83 219 373 83 ' 219 ' 373 '
log_HH_mktwage 0.95098 0.27690 0.53335 * 0.66582 70.43582 0.38608
(0.63756)!!!! (0.30921)!!!! (0.24902)!!!! (1.25668)!!!! (0.40175)!!!! (0.34663)!!!!
total_adult_females 70.01092 70.02464 70.02854 0.03587 70.05749 70.04732
(0.14017)!!!! (0.07871)!!!! (0.08087)!!!! (0.21980)!!!! (0.09201)!!!! (0.07681)!!!!
total_adult_males 0.37555 0.09371 0.07999 0.31742 0.06724 0.03120
(0.25045)!!!! (0.07042)!!!! (0.05391)!!!! (0.24004)!!!! (0.07459)!!!! (0.06372)!!!!
total_children 0.10302 0.10224 * 0.10719 * 0.09915 0.02983 0.09363
(0.07480)!!!! (0.04561)!!!! (0.03648)!!!! (0.09112)!!!! (0.04040)!!!! (0.03509)!!!! *
CIPcrop 0.00240 70.18118 0.05803 0.43020 70.01012 0.07931
(0.63696)!!!! (0.25375)!!!! (0.22967)!!!! (0.68682)!!!! (0.23574)!!!! (0.22892)!!!!
AZ1 0.64926 70.42038 70.43719
(0.50257)!!!! (0.40656)!!!! (0.21954)!!!!
AZ2 70.72851 0.19376 70.30915
(0.88774)!!!! (0.47120)!!!! (0.34787)!!!!
AZ3 0.48939 0.94645 * 0.62823
(0.74088)!!!! (0.42403)!!!! (0.19911)!!!!
AZ4 0.50694 70.50345 70.33735
(0.51440)!!!! (0.40334)!!!! (0.24171)!!!!
AZ5 70.50434 71.40846 0.00000
(0.50936)!!!! (0.40141)!!!! (omitted)
AZ6 0.07628 70.45907 70.11777
(0.42373)!!!! (0.36106)!!!! (0.22340)!!!!
AZ7 0.00000 71.32957 * 71.40696
(omitted) (0.42130)!!!! (0.31195)!!!!
AZ8 0.00000 70.32916 70.18090
(omitted) (0.39133)!!!! (0.30503)!!!!
AZ9 0.97659 * 0.00000 1.15660
(0.44665)!!!! (omitted) (0.28129)!!!!
_cons 70.32161 5.46799 3.29580 2.27622 11.29462 6.16570
(4.33613)!!!! (2.17184)!!!! (1.78379)!!!! (8.56767)!!!! (2.88296)!!!! (2.38415)!!!!
F!test 1.25 4.48 9.67 1.04 3.72 6.21
Standard!errors!appear!in!parentheses
Dependent:''log'(w*)'='log'(pQ/L) Dependent:''log'(w*)'='log'(pQ/L)
(a)!Results!for!41!cells!omitted!for!brevity
Table'IX'?'Le's'Joint'Specification'Test'Results
Le's'Joint'Specification'with'Agro?zones Le's'Joint'Specification'with'Cells'(a)
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5. HOUSEHOLD REACTION TO THE LUC PROGRAM 
 A key attribute of the non-separated household is the desire to mitigate food security 
risk directly by growing the crops that the family eats – what we have termed the production-
consumption alignment. The complement to this attribute is the reluctance to rely on cash 
crops and markets to provide for the family’s sustenance.  
In the LUC program, some households were forced to forgo their preferred 
consumption crops in favor of cash crops. In essence, they are obliged to take on the exact risk 
that they sought to avoid via crop selection. How does the household react to that change?   
The structure of the data in this study allows us to consider that household reaction 
directly. We have a wide variation of LUC treatment (141 values as percent of LUC land for a 
household) in the partial-LUC household group (n=219). Some of these households (n=102) 
No#LUC Partial#LUC All#LUC No#LUC Partial#LUC All#LUC
! 83 219 373 83 ' 219 ' 373 '
log_HH_mktwage 0.36219 0.30941 0.45529 0.07623 70.29921 0.44316
(0.66924)!!!!!!!!!!! (0.30989)!!!! (0.26404)!!!! (1.27244)!!!! (0.39844)!!!! (0.34617)!!!!
pct_maize_grown 70.70106 70.06632 70.32962 70.47475 0.13126 70.28671
(0.44016)!!!!!!!!!!! (0.19512)!!!! (0.18967)!!!! (0.50663)!!!! (0.19597)!!!! (0.18932)!!!!
pct_beans_grown 0.79701 0.42212 0.40254 * 0.66387 0.20644 0.51765
(0.44260)!!!!!!!!!!! (0.21957)!!!! (0.19981)!!!! (0.49672)!!!! (0.21330)!!!! (0.22088)!!!!
pct_totalHH_other_food_grown 1.34578 0.54064 0.25927 0.94650 0.76431 0.47026
(0.88659)!!!!!!!!!!! (0.42097)!!!! (0.41159)!!!! (0.99934)!!!! (0.39867)!!!! (0.40687)!!!!
CIPcrop 70.15411 70.20428 0.02594 0.12318 0.00439 70.05899
(0.49479)!!!!!!!!!!! (0.22913)!!!! (0.19744)!!!! (0.65172)!!!! (0.23195)!!!! (0.23081)!!!!
AZ1 0.60072 70.48994 70.07822
(0.83011)!!!!!!!!!!! (0.44321)!!!! (1.14896)!!!!
AZ2 70.17574 0.22202 0.20583
(1.08998)!!!!!!!!!!! (0.51565)!!!! (1.17713)!!!!
AZ3 0.77135 1.05727 1.14555
(1.02329)!!!!!!!!!!! (0.51488)!!!! (1.15948)!!!!
AZ4 0.57664 70.32481 0.16164
(0.89154)!!!!!!!!!!! (0.42532)!!!! (1.15938)!!!!
AZ5 70.27004 71.56641 * 0.00000
(0.86343)!!!!!!!!!!! (0.50350)!!!! (omitted)
AZ6 0.17246 70.55387 0.28983
(0.86826)!!!!!!!!!!! (0.41555)!!!! (1.14572)!!!!
AZ7 0.00000 71.40106 * 71.07418
(omitted) (0.45460)!!!! (1.17014)!!!!
AZ8 0.00000 70.16288 0.23521
(omitted) (0.47060)!!!! (1.16973)!!!!
AZ9 0.90832 0.00000 1.63588
(0.89858)!!!!!!!!!!! (omitted) (1.16322)!!!!
_cons 3.77840 5.23042 3.62187 7.48781 10.33107 6.08611
(4.43166)!!!!!!!!!!! (2.18073)!!!! (2.16676)!!!! (8.65199)!!!! (2.80926)!!!! (2.37120)!!!!
F!test 1.61 4.37 9.23 1.08 4.00 6.21
Standard!errors!appear!in!parentheses
Dependent:''log'(w*)'='log'(pQ/L) Dependent:''log'(w*)'='log'(pQ/L)
(a)!Results!for!41!cells!omitted!for!brevity
Table'X'>'Le's'Joint'Specification'with'Consumption>Production'Alignment
Le's'Joint'Specification'with'Agro>zones Le's'Joint'Specification'with'Cells'(a)
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had a portion of their land moved into non-consumption crops reducing their ability to align 
farm production with consumption. How is crop selection different in this group compared to 
the non-LUC households who have freedom of choice in crop selection? Are they able to 
preserve the risk-mitigating production-consumption alignment?  
Table XI presents summary statistics for these two groups. There are some significant 
differences. The non-LUC household heads are younger, more female with smaller families and 
fewer adult males. The difference in family size may account for the variation in labor rates.  
The alignment measures are also 
interesting. With less land available for 
consumption crops and a larger family, 
these households were able to match and 
in some cases exceed the production-
consumption alignment of the non-LUC 
households.  
Most important was a larger 
presence of adult males in the household 
contributing to a higher labor rate. They 
also had a higher level of wealth, which 
allowed them to bring in outside labor. In 
effect, these households were more 
productive with their “free plots” which 
were seeded mostly in consumption crops, 
maize and beans, the same crops they 
could not grow on their LUC controlled 
plots.  
Last, we evaluated the notion that 
the partial-LUC households that were in 
programs growing cash crops would test 
as more separated (their shadow wage is 
more sensitive to market wages) than those households partially in LUC programs growing the 
preferred consumption crops (staples).  To do this we applied Benjamin’s test modified with the 
alignment variables developed in the study. The results are presented in Table XII.  
N mean N mean t
'''''Demographics
Male%Head 81 79% 62 75% %
Female%Head 21 21% 21 25%
Head%gender 102 0.794%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 83 0.747%%%%% 90.758
Age%HH%Head 102 46.1 83 43.0%%%%%%% 91.462
Education%HH%Head 102 2.44 83 2.36%%%%%%% 90.518
HH%Size% 102 5.32 83 4.78%%%%%%% 91.907
Adult%Males% 102 1.38 83 0.95%%%%%%% 93.285 *
Adult%Females 102 1.40 83 1.39%%%%%%% 90.147
Children 102 2.53 83 2.45%%%%%%% 90.340
% %
'''Labor'and'Wages % %
HH%market%wage 102 818.07 83 742.39 93.023 *
Total%Labor%(days/month) 102 71.6 83 46.4 93.912 *
Total%Functional%Labor%(days) 102 94.1 83 66.9 92.942 *
% %
'''''Land % %
Total%HH%Land 102 59.42 83 54.12%%%%% 90.464
Total%non9LUC%land 102 35.92 83 54.12%%%%% 1.967
%%%%Total%pct%land%in%LUC 102 64% 83 9%%%%%%%%%
Average%Plot%Size%(ares) 102 22.04 83 29.34%%%%% 0.951
Total%HH%plots 102 2.70 83 1.81%%%%%%% 95.554 *
Total%Harvest%Value%(Rwf) 102 167,754%%%%%%%%%% 83 112,238% 91.883
Yield%per%Are%(Rwf) 102 2,823%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 83 3,368%%%%% 91.094
Total%Plots 102 275 83 150%%%%%%%%
'''''Production'Alignment % %
Pct%Consumed%Maize%grown 102 41.2% 83 43.6% 0.396
Pct%Consumed%Beans%grown 102 57.5% 83 52.1% 90.945
Pct%other%HH%food%grown 102 29.9% 83 24.4% 93.886 *
% %
'''''Other % %
Food%Short%Months 102 1.8 83 2.5%%%%%%%%%% 2.250 *
HH%Shock%Index 102 0.4275 83 0.522%%%%% 2.514 *
HH%Wealth%Index 102 0.5325 83 0.458%%%%% 91.706
% %
Table'XI'='Summary'Statictics'Partial=LUC'Non=Staple
Comparing'Partial=LUC'(Non=Staple)'with'Non=LUC'
Partial'LUC'
(Non=Staple)
No'LUC
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We find that those households forced out of consumption crops became very sensitive to 
market wages, exhibiting greater separation type behavior than even the group where crop 
selection was entirely exogenous.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
We used a unique data set from Rwanda to evaluate the effectiveness of several tests for 
household separation. We find that the simplified Jacoby and Benjamin tests comparing the 
degree of alignment of the market wage to a shadow wage to be good indicators. Le’s joint 
specification was less useful as were the modifications for household structure as a proxy for 
consumption preferences and geographic indicators to control for weather and soil quality.  
We applied a direct self-reported measure of production-consumption alignment as a 
replacement for household structure in Benjamin and Le. This modification showed the shift in 
separation that Benjamin had predicted.  
Finally, we evaluated household reaction to the LUC program in the only instance 
where households retained some land resources to exhibit a reaction. We found that as the crop 
decisions became exogenous forcing the use of non-preference crops, we observed an increasing 
alignment of the shadow wage with the market wage. Further, in cases where the exogenous 
crop decision happens to include the preference crops, the alignment of the shadow wage with 
the market wage was much less pronounced.  
  
No#LUC
Partial#LUC#
in#staples All#LUC
Partial#LUC#
not#in#staples
! 83 117 373 102
log_HH_mktwage 0.03181 0.06813 1.08512 * 2.51944 *
(0.5475)!!!!!! (0.4118)!!!!!! (0.2500)!!!!!! (0.5513)!!!!!!!!!!!
pct_maize_grown A0.95119 * A0.09381 A0.28603 0.21045
(0.4019)!!!!!! (0.2780)!!!!!! (0.1943)!!!!!! (0.2743)!!!!!!!!!!!
pct_beans_grown 0.89573 * 0.34588 0.05184 ! A0.56703
(0.4315)!!!!!! (0.3011)!!!!!! (0.2019)!!!!!! (0.3043)!!!!!!!!!!!
pct_other_food_grown 1.33978 A0.59781 A0.56479 0.88792
! (0.8048)!!!!!! (0.6047)!!!!!! (0.4275)!!!!!! (0.6135)!!!!!!!!!!!
_cons 6.22267 6.50647 0.20317 A9.77480
(3.5865)!!!!!! (2.7326)!!!!!! (1.6665)!!!!!! (3.6822)!!!!!!!!!!!
F!test 2.64 0.55 7.04
Standard!errors!appear!in!parentheses
Table,XII,/,Benjamin,with,Consumption,Alignment,(Partial,LUC,Split)
Original,Benjamin,with,Consumption,Alignment
Dependent:,,log,(w*),=,log,(pQ/L)
	   28 
References 
Ahmad, M. (2003). Agricultural productivity, efficiency, and rural poverty in irrigated 
Pakistan: A stochastic production frontier analysis. Pakistan Development Review, 
42(3), 219-248. doi:http://www.pide.org.pk/ 
Assuncao, J. J., & Braido, L. H. B. (2007). Testing household-specific explanations for 
the inverse productivity relationship. doi:http://0-
ajae.oxfordjournals.org.ignacio.usfca.edu/content/by/year 
Assuncao, J. J., & Ghatak, M. (2003). Can unobserved heterogeneity in farmer ability 
explain the inverse relationship between farm size and productivity? doi:http://0-
www.elsevier.com.ignacio.usfca.edu/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/505
574/description#description 
Barrett, C. B., Bellemare, M. F., & Hou, J. Y. (2010). Reconsidering conventional 
explanations of the inverse productivity-size relationship. Unpublished 
manuscript. From http://0-
search.ebscohost.com.ignacio.usfca.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=11
29970&site=ehost-live&scope=site; 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1478393_code345989.pdf?a
bstractid=1275353&mirid=1 
Bellemare, M. F. (2010). Agricultural extension and imperfect supervision in contract 
farming: Evidence from Madagascar. Agricultural Economics, 41(6), 507-517. 
doi:http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0169-5150&site=1 
Benjamin, D (1992). Labor Markets and Labor Demand: Testing for Separation in 
Agricultural Household Models. Econometrica, Vol. 60, No 2 (March 1992) pp. 
287-322. 
Benjamin, D. (1995). Can unobserved land quality explain the inverse productivity 
relationship? doi:http://0-
www.elsevier.com.ignacio.usfca.edu/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/505
546/description#description 
Benjamin, D., & Brandt, L. (1997). Land, factor markets, and inequality in rural china: 
Historical evidence. doi:http://0-
www.elsevier.com.ignacio.usfca.edu/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/622
830/description 
Binam, J. N., Tonye, J., wandji, N., Nyambi, G., & Akoa, M. (2004). Factors affecting the 
technical efficiency among smallholder farmers in the slash and burn agriculture 
zone of Cameroon. Food Policy, 29(5), 531-545. doi:http://0-
www.elsevier.com.ignacio.usfca.edu/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/304
19/description#description 
Blarel, B. (1992). The economics of farm fragmentation: Evidence from Ghana and 
Rwanda. doi:http://0-wber.oxfordjournals.org.ignacio.usfca.edu/ 
	   29 
 
Byiringiro, F. (. 1. )., & Reardon, T. (. 2. ). (1996). Farm productivity in Rwanda: Effects 
of farm size, erosion, and soil conservation investments. Agricultural Economics, 
15(2), 127-136. doi:10.1016/S0169-5150(96)01201-7 
Carter, M., Wiebe, K., & Blarel, B. (1990) Land Titles, Tenure Security, and 
Agricultural Productivity: Theoretical Issues and an Econometric Analysis of 
Mediating Factors in Njoro Division. doi: 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABF251.pdf 
Chayanov, A.V. (1923) On the Theory of Peasant Economy. Ed. By Thorner, D. et al. 
University of Wisconsin Press. (1986) Chapter 3, pp. 90-117. 
Chen, Z., Huffman, W. E., & Rozelle, S. (2011). Inverse relationship between 
productivity and farm size: The case of china. Contemporary Economic Policy, 29(4), 
580-592. doi:http://0-www.blackwell-synergy.com.ignacio.usfca.edu/loi/coep/ 
Deininger, K., & Feder, G. (2001). In Gardner B. L., Rausser G. C.(Eds.), Land 
institutions and land markets. Handbooks in Economics, vol. 18; Amsterdam; 
London and New York:; Elsevier Science, North-Holland. Retrieved from 
http://0 
rsearch.ebscohost.com.ignacio.usfca.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0
664968&site=ehost-live&scope=site 
De Janvry, A., & Sadoulet, E. (2006). Progress in the Modeling of Rural Households’ 
Behavior Under Market Failures, Poverty, Inequality and Development, Chapter 9, 
155-181, Springer US, DOI 10.1007/0-387-29748-0_9 Online ISBN 978-0-387-
29748-4 
 
Des Forges, A. (2006). Land in Rwanda: Winnowing Out the Chaff. L'Afrique des grands 
Lacs. Annuaire 2005-2006. 353-371. Centre d'Etude de la Région des Grands Lacs 
d'Afrique ; L'Harmattan http://www.ua.ac.be/objs/00151020.pdf 
Dillon, A. (2011). Do differences in the scale of irrigation projects generate different 
impacts on poverty and production? Journal of Agricultural Economics, 62(2), 474-
492. doi:http://0-
www3.interscience.wiley.com.ignacio.usfca.edu/journal/120775364/grouphome/
home.html 
Dorward, A. (1999). Farm size and productivity in Malawian smallholder agriculture. 
Journal of Development Studies, 35(5), 141-161. 
doi:http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/00220388.asp 
Ellis, F. (2000). Peasant Economics: Farm Households and Agrarian Development. 
Cambridge University Press, Chapter 6, pp.105-120. 
 
	   30 
Eswaran, M., & Kotwal, A. (1986). Access to Capital and Agrarian Production 
Organization. Economic Journal, 96(382), 482-498. 
doi:http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0013-0133 
Jacoby, H. G. (1993). Shadow Wages and Peasant Family Labour Supply: An 
Econometric Application to the Peruvian Sierra. The Review of Economic Studies, 
Vol. 60, No.4 (October 1993), pp. 903-921, doi: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2298105 
Kathiresan, A. (2012). Farm Land Use Consolidation in Rwanda. Republic of Rwanda, 
Ministry of Agriculture. doi: www.minagri.gov.rw 
Kimhi, A. (2006). Plot size and maize productivity in Zambia: Is there an inverse 
relationship? Agricultural Economics, 35(1), 1-9. 
doi:http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0169-5150&site=1 
Kondylis, F. (2008). Agricultural outputs and conflict displacement: Evidence from a 
policy intervention in Rwanda. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 57(1), 
31-66. doi:http://0-
www.journals.uchicago.edu.ignacio.usfca.edu/EDCC/home.html 
Lamb, R. L. (2003). Inverse productivity: Land quality, labor markets, and measurement 
error. doi:http://0-
www.elsevier.com.ignacio.usfca.edu/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/505
546/description#description 
Ligon, E. (2011). Notes on the Farm-Household Model. Working Paper. 
http://are.berkeley.edu/courses/ARE251/fall2011/Lectures/farm-
household_model.pdf 
Le, K. T. (2010). Separation hypothesis tests in the agricultural household model. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 92(5), 1420-1431. doi: http://0-
ajae.oxfordjournals.org.ignacio.usfca.edu/ 
Lopez, R.E., (1984), Estimating Labor Supply and Productions Decisions of Self-
Employed Farm Producers, European Economic Review, 24, 61-82 Elsevier Science 
Publishers B.V. (North Holland) 0014-2921/84 
Low, A. (1989). Agricultural Development in Southern Africa: Farm-Household 
Economics & the Food Crisis. James Currey Ltd., David Philip Publishers (Pty) Ltd., 
Heinemann Educational Books Inc., Part I, pp. 11-55. 
Matchaya, G. (2007). Does Size of Operated Area Matter? Evidence from Malawi’s 
Agricultural Production. International Journal of Agricultural and Rural 
Development, 10(2), 114-125. doi: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de 
May, J.F. (1995) Policies on Population, Land Use, and Environment in Rwanda. 
Population and Environment, Volume 16, Issue 4, pp 321-334. doi: 
http://link.springer.com/article 
	   31 
 
Millar, J. R. (1990). A reformulation of A. V. Chayanov's theory of the peasant economy. 
In J. R. Millar (Ed.), (pp. 3-15) Edited and with an introduction by Susan J. Linz; 
Urbana, Ill.:; University of Illinois Press. Retrieved from http://0-
search.ebscohost.com.ignacio.usfca.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=02
83358&site=ehost-live&scope=site 
Muhinda, J.J. & Dusengemungu, L. (2011). Farm Land Use Consolidation – a Home 
Grown Solution for Food Security in Rwanda. Rwanda Agriculture Board. doi: 
http://rpfinkotanyi.org/en/IMG/pdf 
Murangwa, Y. (2012). Enquête Intérgral sur les Conditions de Vie des Ménages. 
National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda. doi: 
http://www.statistics.gov.rw/survey-period/integrated-household-living-
conditions-survey-3-eicv-3 
ORGANIC LAW N° 08/2005 OF 14/07/2005 DETERMINING THE USE AND 
MANAGEMENT OF LAND IN RWANDA,  
www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/oeur/arch/rwa/ORGANIC_LAW_N.doc 
 
Salas, J., & Smith, R. J. (1959). Farm plot consolidation in Spain. Land Economics, 35, 
356-360. Retrieved from http://0-
search.ebscohost.com.ignacio.usfca.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=12
02920&site=ehost-live&scope=site 
Sen, A.K. (1962). An Aspect of Indian Agriculture. The Economic Weekly. doi:  
http://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/1962_14/4-5-
6/an_aspect_of_indian_agriculture.pdf 
 
Sen, A. K. (2002). Peasants and dualism with or without surplus labor. In A. K. Dutt 
(Ed.), (pp. 331-356) Elgar Reference Collection. International Library of Critical 
Writings in Economics, vol. 140; Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.:; 
Elgar; distributed by American International Distribution Corporation, 
Williston, Vt. doi: http://0-search.ebscohost.com.ignacio.usfca.edu 
 
